Left for Dead: Asian Production Networks and the Revival of US Electronics by Borrus, Michael
THE
MIT
PROG
JAPAN
RAM
Science, Technology,
Management
LEFT FOR DEAD:
ASIAN PRODUCTION NETWORKS
AND THE REVIVAL OF US ELECTRONICS
Michael Borrus
MITJP 96-24
Center for International Studies
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
-J-TB ·----s --·---- ---C----"
0 * . A16 %.p yl-r'?
-b
Distributed courtesy of the
MIT JAPAN PROGRAM
Science · Technology Management
E38-754
Centerfor International Studies
77Massachusetts Avenue, Cambridge, MA 02139
Tel: 617-253-8095
Fax: 617-258-7432
Email: <sherwood@mit.edu>
©1996 MIT Japan Program
LEFT FOR DEAD:
ASIAN PRODUCTION NETWORKS
AND THE REVIVAL OF US ELECTRONICS
Michael Borrus
MITJP 96-24
- ·II --------
About the MIT Japan Program
and its Working Paper Series
The MIT Japan Program was founded in 1981 to create a new generation
of technologically sophisticated "Japan-aware" scientists, engineers, and
managers in the United States. The Program's corporate sponsors, as
well as support from the government and from private foundations, have
made it the largest, most comprehensive, and most widely emulated
center of applied Japanese studies in the world.
The intellectual focus of the Program is to integrate the research
methodologies of the social sciences, the humanities, and technology to
approach issues confronting the United States and Japan in their
relations involving science and technology. The Program is uniquely
positioned to make use of MIT's extensive network of Japan-related
resources, which include faculty, researchers, and library collections, as
well as a Tokyo-based office. Through its three core activities, namely,
education, research, and public awareness, the Program disseminates
both to its sponsors and to the interested public its expertise on Japanese
science and technology and on how that science and technology is
managed.
The MIT Japan Program Working Paper Series provides an important
means to achieving these ends.
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Left for Dead: Asian Production
Networks and the Revival of US Electronics'
I: Evolution in Electronics: Global Competition and the Persistence of National
Identity
International competition in electronics has always been a story about market
rivalry between firms with distinctive national identities: U.S. firms confronted Japanese
or German firms. Each acted in ways characteristic of their national point of origin.
Market outcomes were a function of how well the strategies and organizational traits
originating in one domestic market generated competitive advantage in other national
markets.2 A specific understanding of the international economy grounded that story-
line, one in which sovereign nations trade and invest with each other. The understanding
has been a constant for at least half a century, even through the shift in principal agency
from national firms trading on the basis of local factors to so-called multinational
corporations (MNCs) who invested abroad but retained a characteristic identity with
their national point of origin.
An account of the evolution of recent competition in electronics within this
tradition of discourse would go something like this. From the early 1970s until the mid-
1980s, Japanese producers were ascendant in electronics. In short order, they had taken
over consumer electronics, gained leading world market shares in semiconductor chips,
materials and equipment, and looked entirely capable of repeating the feat in computers,
office systems (e.g., copiers, faxes), and customer telecommunications equipment. So
worried were US policy-makers and industrialists that the avowedly laissez-faire Reagan
Administration took the unprecedented step of using interventionist industrial policy to
support the domestic microelectronics industry.3 If the rapid rates of attrition of U.S.
'This chapter is drawn in part from a larger work in progress on global competition in electronics. See.
Michael Bormrs, Punctuated Equilibria in Electronieto Microsystems, Standards' Competitions, and
Asian Production Networks, forthcoming, 1996.
2See, for example, Michael Porter's extensive comparative analysis of domestic competitive factors in, The
Competitive Advantage of Nations, (London: MacMillain, 1990)
3The government's support took two forms - direct financial support of $100 million per year to the
industry's manufacturing technology consortium, Sematech - or half of Sematech's annual budget -- and
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market share had continued, US firms would have joined their European counterparts as
significant players only in niches and on the margin of mass global markets.
What a difference a decade made. By 1994, US producers of silicon chips and
semiconductor materials and equipment were again flourishing, having regained the
dominant world position. US producers of office, communications and computer
systems had reasserted product and technical leadership, with especially the latter
retaining clear market dominance. As computer technology began to pervade consumer
electronics, those same producers even looked to be reviving defunct US consumer
fortunes. By contrast, with few exceptions, their once formidable Japanese competition
appeared disorganized, dismayed and decidedly on the defensive. Indeed, US industry
leaders were so certain of continued success that many dismissed the Japanese giants as
competitive dinosaurs, ill-adapted to the raucous, fast, changeable, idea-intensive
electronics markets of the future.4
As argued below, however, the recent success of US-owned firms has rested in
significant part upon extensive inter-firm relationships with Asian-based producers.
Those cross-boarder ties permitted US-owned firms to exploit the growing technical
sophistication and competitive strength of indigenous firms initially in Taiwan, Singapore
and Korea, and later throughout Southeast Asia and along the coastal provinces of
Mainland China. Those proliferating cross-boarder links suggest that the future success
of US firms is increasingly bound up with non-US partners. They hint at a very different
kind of international economy, one whose emblem is globalization and in which cross-
border, inter-firm relationships blur the easy identity of nations and firms. Must they
therefore also call into question the continued utility of an account of competition that
stresses rivalry between identifiable national industries?
negotiation of the US-Japan Semiconductor Trade Agreement (STA). For details, see Michael Bonus,
Competing for Control: America's Stake in Microelectronics, (NY: Ballinger, 1988).
4This position is argued explicitly by industry consultant William F. Finan and his academic collaborator
Jeffrey Frey in their Nihon no Gijyutsu ga Abunai: Kensho, Haiteku Sangyo no Suitai [Japan's Crisis in
Electronics: Failure of the Vision] (Tokyo: Nikkei Press, 1994).
3
_ ________XIII__Y__I11^---1 i.. .._.-
©Michael Borrus, Left for Dead, May 1996
The international economy has changed for sure. Economic interconnections have
clearly expanded across geographic distance and between firms and nations. The terms of
market competition have been altered irrevocably in most sectors as a combination of new
technologies, markets, and players have entered the economic fray. Those facts are not in
issue; but their patterns and significance most surely are. Without a doubt, capital,
intermediate inputs, technologies, know-how and corporate best practices, flow more
rapidly across national boundaries than ever before. But, as argued below, those global
movements have not globally diffused location-specific advantages or leveled national
distinctions. They have not eviscerated consequential national differences in corporate
behavior. Ownership continues to matter in understanding international competition,
though in an era of global markets, investment and competition, the ways in which
ownership is significant have shifted ground.
Even in an industry like electronics, dominated by multinational corporations
(MNCs) - MNCs that are, moreover, entangled in a growing web ofjoint development
and production arrangements -- an analytic that distinguishes between US-, Japan-, and
Asia-based industries still makes sense. The analysis here presumes that the international
market dynamic in most high-tech industries can still be effectively analyzed as a
competition between firms operating out of largely national home bases.5 By 'home base'
I mean the national market in which the majority of a firm's assets, employment and sales
reside, and from which corporate control is exercised (especially control over strategy
formation, corporate re-organization, new product development, finance and distribution).
In most cases the home base is also the predominant locus of corporate ownership.
By that definition, very few high-tech MNCs are globally footloose. Indeed, 2/3-
3/4 of the assets, employment and sales of most MNCs, and an overwhelming percentage
5Applying and exploring the limits of this method are principle goals of BRIE research supported by the
Alfred P. Sloan Foundation That research is elaborated in a forthcoming BRIE book on national
technology trajectories with contributions by Benedicte Callon, Keilb Dardon, Ulrike Hodges, Tim
Sturgeon, Jay Tate, Michael Bonrus, David Soskice, and John Zysmamn
4
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of their best-compensated and highest-skilled jobs, are still in a home base.6 Of the
world's top 50 MNCs of all national origins, who might be expected to be the most non-
national of MNCs, almost all fall in the 60-90% range of assets within the home country.7
Equally significant, almost all MNC firms still explicitly exercise control from their home
country of origin. 8
Given those facts, this paper's analytic sees firm strategies as still systematically
shaped by the logic of competition in the home market base. Domestic institutions shape
a national market logic or system of production 9 -- i.e., characteristic ways of doing
business and distinctive trajectories of technology development that are the basis of
product differentiation on international markets. 10 For high-tech industries, the principle
domestic institutional variables include )the structure of the industry in question and of
its domestic market (e.g. oligopolistic, keiretsu, lead customers); 2) technology, trade and
industrial policies and the political system that implements them; 3) the capital and labor
6 See the discussion in Laura Tyson, "They Are Not US," The American Prospct, (Winter, 1991),
p.37ff. See also, Yao-Su Hu, "Global Corporations Are National Finnrms with International Operations",
California Management Review Winter, 1992, p. 107ff. Of course, the debate addressed by these articles
was popularly launched by Robert Reich in "Who is Us?" Harvar Business Review, (Jan.-Feb., 1990)
p.53ff. More generally, the recent collection by Dennis Encamrnation, ed., Does Ownership Matter? (NY
and London: Oxford University Press, 1995) supports the persistence of important differences among
multinational firms based on national origin.
7 See "A Survey of Multinationals" The Economist, March 27,1993, p.6-7, citing United Nations data.
The major exceptions are oil companies (because oil fields tend to be located abroad) and small country
multinationals like Nestle, Unilever and ABB (because their markets are located abroad) -- and the latter
would fall into the 60-90% range if Europe was treated as their home base. By that measure, the most non-
oil MNC is IBM, with about 50% of assets outside of the U.S. But because half of its assets are still
concentrated in the U.S., even IBM can be said to have the U.S. as its home base.
8This conclusion is easily reached from industry conversations and even a quick perusal of the annual
reports of the 1000 largest US and 1000 largest non-US finns. More generally, the evidence in John
Dunning's comprehensive work on MNCs supports this conclusion, Multinationals, Technology, and
Competitiveness, (London: Unwin Hyman, 1988), as does Michael Porter's work, supra.
9 My colleague Stephen Cohen coined the concept of national market logics in Bormrus, Cohen, et.al,
"Globalization and Production," BRIE Working Papers, #45 (Berkeley: BRIE, 1991).
'°For a discussion of this concept of technology trajectories see Michael Borrus, "The Regional
Architecture of Global Electronics: Trajectories, Linkages and Access to Technology" and the sources cited
there, in Peter Gourevitch and Paolo Guierrieri, eds., New Challenges to International Cooperation:
Adjustment ofFirms, Policies, and Organizations to Global Competition, (San Diego: UCSD, 1993).
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market structures that condition access to those factor inputs; and 4)the local supply base
which enables access to technology factor inputs. l'
Those variables create a fabric of possibilities, a pattern of constraint and
opportunity that confronts firms as they choose strategies, making some choices more
likely (or less risky) and foreclosing others. Consider, for example, how U.S. antitrust
enforcement denies to US firms the use of market-sharing arrangements that are routinely
adopted in Japan and parts of Europe. Or consider how Japan's life-time employment
system encouraged corporate strategies built on in-house training and up-skilling of
technical employees. Or how 'guanxi' networks permit smaller Taiwanese family 'firms'
to stably deal in high-risk international ventures.' 2
As such examples suggest, the home base's pattern of constraint and opportunity
channels, in characteristic directions, corporate strategies and behavior and, through them,
technology development. For example, a well developed venture capital market, highly
flexible labor market, leading-edge military and computer industry demand, and
competitive industry structure characterized by easy entry and exit, all shaped a US-
based semiconductor industry with characteristic strategies and technologies based on
radical product innovation. 13 By contrast, keiretsu-dominated capital and distribution,
inflexible labor markets, price-sensitive consumer demand, and a panoply of industrial and
trade policies, shaped a Japanese semiconductor industry with equally characteristic
strategies and technologies based, in contrast to the US pattern, on incremental
manufacturing innovation.
"For one effort to elucidate some of these variables - the state, and the legal, labor relations and financial
systems - as part of a formal analytic explaining national economic development, see John Zysman, "How
Institutions Create Historically Rooted Trajectories of Growth," (Berkeley, BRIE, October, 1993) draft
manuscript. Some of the variables described above ar simiilar to those used by Michael Porter,
Competitive Advantage, supra, however, to different end in a decidedly different, albeit complementary,
analytic.
1 On the 'guanxi' network concept see Gary G. Hamilton, "Competition and Organization: A
Reexamination of Chinese Business Practices," paper prepared for the IGCC Conference The China
Circle: Regional Consequences of Evolving Relations Among the PtC, Taiwan, and Hong Kong-Macao,
Hong Kong, December 8-10, 1994
'
3For a fuller discussion of this US-Japan comparison, see Bonus, Competingfor Control, supra, at
chapters 4 and 5.
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Of course, a broad range of contingent choices is always available within any given
pattern of constraint and opportunity. Strategies can and do differ among firms facing
similar constraints, not least because they start with different resources and actively
respond to what their competitors are doing. Nor are firms inflexibly bound to the home
base's particular mix of possibilities. They can seek external opportunities or devise
ways around national constraints. As the argument below suggests, U.S. firms did exactly
that by creating their Asian-based production networks. In the real world of commerce,
then, the home-base institutions that shape a national system of production are less
independent variables in a formal analytic than systemic constraints tending to push
strategies in particular directions, but without determining them.
That inherent openness of the analytic permits revision over time as evidence
accrues to challenge the hypotheses it generates. Indeed, this paper suggests that regional
and sub-regional production systems in electronics may be gradually supplanting national
ones. This would be an unintended consequence of the Asian-based production network
strategy of US firms, the sub-regional production networks it helped to spawn
throughout Asia under the control of indigenous Asian capital, and the parallel regional
response of Japanese firms. As argued, below, such networks start-out as an extra-
territorial extension across national borders of a home-base market logic; but the extension
is almost inevitably likely to alter the logic over time. Were such developments to
diminish considerably the significance of the national home-base, they would require
revision of the approach adopted here.
Until then, however, the overall working hypothesis is that for most firms the
national market logic dominates international market strategies. This holds especially for
the dominant Japanese electronics firms and even for the US-based MNCs who adjusted
to high-tech competition by constructing production networks outside the U.S. The
several competitive shifts that lie behind the recent American re-ascendance in electronics
demonstrate this quite well. Consider first the shift involving the domestic Japanese
economy after 1990, from economic miracle to economic basket case.
7
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The bursting of the domestic Japanese asset bubble, the attendant, lengthy
recession in the Japanese economy, and multiple endaka (dramatic yen appreciation), did
much to undermine the international competitive position of Japanese electronics firms.
Far more than Japanese firms were willing to admit even to themselves, Japan's
electronics success in the 1970s and 80s was driven by rapid growth in the sheltered
domestic market. Rapid domestic growth afforded the stable demand to reach scale
economies, the launch market for several generations of consumer and office systems,
premium prices to subsidize price competition on foreign markets, cheap capital for
continuous reinvestment, and not least, quality- and feature-conscious consumers who
rewarded corporate strategies built on incremental product revisions.' 4 Cheap capital
ended when the asset bubble burst, provoking Japan's longest post-war recession.
Enduring recession put an end, at least temporarily, to the domestic economy's ability to
support firm strategies premised on rapid growth, and to the willingness of retailers
blindly to support the producer-controlled pricing structure. 15 Combined with
successive endaka, the economic problems made Japanese firms increasingly vulnerable to
price competition both at home and abroad - something exploited at least as well by
Korean and Taiwanese firms as by American.
That Japan's domestic economic problems could so profoundly influence the
international competitive performance of Japanese-owned firms is one strong piece of
evidence that ownership and a national home base still matter. The competitive shifts
that account for the resurgence of US market and technical leadership offer further
evidence. Two competitive shifts are of paramount importance there - one in the market
and one in production organization - and both have strong roots in a domestic home base.
The market shift encompassed both a transformation of the character of electronic
'
4For a fuller analysis, see Borrus, Competing for Control, supra. The domestic market served as a launch
market during the late 1970s-1980s for, among other products, the VCR, Camcorder, Walkman, hand-held
TV, fax machine, portable copier, and notebook PC.
5 0On the latter point, see Ichiro Uchida, "Restructuring of the Japanese Economy" in Eileen Doherty, ed.,
Japanese Investment in Asia: International Production Strategies in a Rapidly Changing World, (U.C.
Berkeley: Berkeley Roundtable on the International Economy, 1995).
8
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systems products and a resulting sea-change in the industry's principal business
strategies. Specifically, new electronics product-markets have begun to converge on a
common technological foundation of networkable, 'open', microprocessor-based systems
(of which, the PC is emblematic).16 Such new product markets are characterized by a
predominant form of market rivalry, namely competitions to set defacto market
standards. Over the last half decade, the domestic U.S. market has been the principle
launch market for such new products and the principle terrain on which the resulting
standards competitions have been fought. With just a few exceptions - e.g., Nintendo in
video games, Sony in 8mm video camcorders - U.S. firms defined the products, set and
controlled the standards initially in their home market, and, achieved dominant world
market positions as US choices became global standards.
The organizational shift was, however, just as significant and in its own way
permitted the new product-market strategies to succeed. The shift in U.S. firm
production organization was the move away from traditional integration to network forms
of organization, specifically, international production networks centered in Asia.' 7 By a
firm's international production network I mean the organization, across national borders,
of the relationships (intra and increasingly inter-firm) through which the firm conducts
research and development, product definition and design, procurement, manufacturing,
distribution, and support services. . As a first approximation, such networks comprise a
lead firm, its subsidiaries and affiliates, its subcontractors and suppliers, its distribution
channels and sources of value-added product or service features, its joint ventures, R&D
'6By 'open', I mean that key product specifications, especially the interface specifications which permit
interoperability with the operating system or system hardware, are published or licensed and thus available
to independent designers of systems or software who can produce complementary or competing products.
17 For one elaboration of the concept of international production networks, see Dieter Ernst "Networks,
Market Structure and Technology Diffusion: A Conceptual Framework and Some Empirical Evidence,"
report prepared for the OECD, Paris, 1992. More generally, on network forms of organization see Walter
Powell's classic, "Neither Market Nor Hierarchy: Network Forms of Organization," Research in
Organizational Behavior, v.12, 1990, p.295-336. The electronics case strongly confirms Powell's
argument that the network form is not some intermediate mix of market or hierarchy. Indeed, far from being
the optimal organizational poles, markets and hierarchies can be fruitfully thought of as specific forms of
networks, with network relations being mediated in the former by price signals and buyer-seller transactions
and in the latter by command signals and power relations.
9
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alliances and other cooperative arrangements (like standards consortia). In contrast to
traditional forms of corporate organization, such networks boost a proliferation of non-
equity, non-arms-length, cross-border, inter-firm relationships in which significant value
is added outside the lead firm and entire business functions may be outsourced.
The move to such production networks based in Asia during the 1980s, had three
significant consequences for U.S. firms. U.S. firms were able to relieve the constraining
threat of competitive dependence on Japanese firms for a wide range of component
technologies and manufacturing capabilities because their Asian production networks
became a competitive supply base alternative to Japanese producers.' 8 Simultaneously,
the networks helped to lower production costs and turnaround times while keeping pace
with rapid technological progress. Finally, the networks spawned Asian-based direct
competitors to Japanese firms in several of their stronghold markets (e.g., memory chips,
consumer electronics, and displays).
Taken together, the market and organizational shifts enabled US firms to pioneer a
new form of competition in electronics, one that grew out of the distinctively American
market environment and was adapted to overseas opportunities. Each of the US-owned
enterprises that pioneered the shifts and dominated market outcomes is by and large a
new type of firm competing in a new type of way in the international economy. It's
'core asset' is the intellectual property and know-how associated with setting,
maintaining and continuously evolving a de-facto market standard, a process that requires
perpetual improvements in product features, functionality, performance, costs and
quality. It's core managerial skill is orchestrating the continuously changing sets of
external relationships and melding them with the relatively more stable core of internal
activities in order to access relevant technologies, design, develop, and manufacture the
prox.-?cts, and get them from product concept to order fulfillment in minimal time.
Although a few vertically integrated firms like HP and Motorola play this game, most of
'
8The next section defines the concept of supply base.
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the successful players are fleet-footed US firms like Sun Microsystems, Cisco Systems,
3Com, Intel, Netscape, Microsoft.
Compare, for example, a firm such as Cisco Systems, leading supplier of routers,
switches and hubs for corporate communications networks, with the network equipment
business of the pre-divestiture ATT and its international counterpart, ITT. Everything
from the R&D at central corporate laboratories to product design, engineering,
manufacturing, distribution and service was done by one ATT/ITT affiliate or another,
usually located somewhere in the U.S. for ATT or Europe for ITT. The vast bulk of the
underlying technologies, components, parts, software and subsystems were produced
internally by the two companies. The finished product was "sold" direct to local phone
companies. Control was hierarchical and centralized in the U.S. ATT was the epitome of
the hierarchically managed, vertically integrated, multidivisional corporation. ITT was the
epitome of the modern corporation's multinational extension to other markets.
By contrast, much of Cisco's R&D is done at its corporate headquarters in Silicon
Valley, but a portion is also done through technology development alliances with key
suppliers such as chip companies and software vendors. Associated engineering is done
in Cisco affiliates in Japan and California, but sometimes also by lead vendors. The
products are assembled in California, and Japan from components and manufacturing
services (e.g., board-stuffing, PCB design) that flow from a variety of independent
suppliers throughout Asia (including Taiwan, Korea, Japan, Singapore, Thailand, and
Malaysia) and the U.S. and sometimes Europe. These suppliers are bound to Cisco
through a variety of non-equity contractual arrangements. Cisco's Japanese "subsidiary",
however, which is responsible for customizing the products for the Japanese market, is
"owned" by Cisco and 14 major Japanese electronics companies (each with an equity
stake), that together form a formidable coalition aimed at making Cisco's "owned" but
open protocols the standard for corporate communications in Japan.
11
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Several independent companies in California, Asia and Europe (including most of
its Japanese partners) produce to Cisco's standard, adding value in the form of products
or services that interface in some fashion with Cisco's products-and without which
Cisco's products would not be complete because they could not fully perform core
functions (a significant difference from the more traditional model of behavior in which a
firm might sell into the Bell System in competition with Western Electric, but the
customer did not need the outsider product to have a complete system). The final
product is sold direct to customers but also through a variety of third-party channels
including value-added resellers and systems integrators. After-sales service is very
frequently undertaken by third-party suppliers.
As the example suggests, the new form of competition is no longer confined
largely to equity investments and outsourcing in the manufacturing stage of production.
It now extends throughout the value chain and to an increasing variety of non-equity, but
not arms-length relations. Consider, for example, Internet software producer Netscape
Communications' product development and distribution relationships: Product
development is done in conjunction with a variety of independent development partners
such as SUN, Macromedia, Real Audio, Streamworks and others who develop "plug-in"
packages of software functionality (e.g., Javascript applets, authoring tools, audio and
video players) designed to work seamlessly with Netscape's browser-server products-
and without which the product would not be fully functional. The software is distributed
direct to customers and through a variety of independent channels including on-line
service providers such as Compuserve and AOL, traditional carriers such as Pacific Bell,
specialized retailers such as EggHead Software, value-added resellers who provide Web
set-up services, and mass marketers such as Costco.
As the examples suggest, this new form of competition has left no part of the
information technology and electronics sector untouched: It holds true as much for
Microsoft as for hardware vendors such as Cisco, as much for large-scale systems
builders such as HP as for integrators such as Anderson Consulting -- and as much for
12
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standard-followers such as Compaq as for standard-holders such as Netscape. For these
firms, in important ways, their US home base was more significant in the last ten years of
increasing global competition than it had been earlier in the era of clearly defined national
industries. Indeed, even discounting supportive US trade and technology policies, the
global leadership of US firms was rebuilt on a domestic foundation -- the American
market's characteristic logic of competitive ferment, and its leadership both in the
networking of microcomputer-based systems and in the design, product definition, and
systems architecture capabilities that created the new standards. Key attributes of the
new network form of production organization reflected unique characteristics of the
domestic US environment. Indeed, while most firms in the industry gravitated toward a
network model in response to similar global market conditions, those models differed by
ownership and control: As we argue below, the distinctively American model contrasts
with equally distinctive production networks under the control of Japanese, Taiwanese
and other indigenous Asian capital/ - though for reasons explored below, those alternative
network models were competitively less effective than the American in the last round of
market rivalry.
The rest of this paper takes a closer look at the shift in production organization,
the way it created an alternative supply base in Asia, and the role it played in the
resurgence by US firms to product and technical leadership in electronics. The next
section describes the historical development of US direct investment in electronics in Asia
over the past three decades, comparing it to Japanese investment and contrasting the
consequences. The following section then examines the indigenous complement to US
firm strategies in Asia, namely the emerging networked production capabilities under the
control of especially Taiwanese and Singapore capital. The concluding section develops a
production network typology to examine the respective positions of US, Japanese, and
Taiwanese electronics firms, and draws conclusions about whether national ownership
will continue to matter in global electronics markets.
13
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II: US FDI and the Creation of a Regional Supply Base
By the end of the 1970s, US electronics firms were almost completely dependent
on Japanese competitors for supply of the underlying component technologies (e.g.,
tuners, picture tubes, recording heads, miniature motors) necessary to produce consumer
electronics products. 19 In most cases, thorough-going technology dependence was a first
step toward market exit. It meant that US firms were far enough removed from the
technological state of the art to impede new product development, and that their principal
competitors could dictate time-to-market, product cost and feature quality. Under those
circumstances, profits were minimal - if any were to be had at all. Consequently, by
1980 most major US firms had exited the consumer segment of the market and remaining
players like GE and RCA survived largely by putting their brands on Japanese OEM
production. A few short years later, even RCA and GE, who had created most of the
consumer electronic technologies that Japanese firms perfected, left the business.
The loss of consumer electronics' high-volume demand eroded the US supply base
for the other segments of the electronics industry, and threatened them with an equally,
competitively constraining architecture ofsupply. 20 The supply base is the local
capability to supply the component, machinery, materials and control technologies (e.g.,
software), and the associated know-how, that producers use to develop and manufacture
products. The architecture of supply is the structure of the markets and other organized
interactions (e.g., joint development) through which the underlying technologies reach
producers. In effect, US producers of industrial electronics (e.g., computers,
communications) were in danger of becoming dependent on their Japanese competitors for
memory chips, displays, precision components, and a wealth of the other essential
'
9See the discussion of sequential increasing supply dependence in consumer electronics in Consunmer
Electronics Sector Working Group, AIT Commission on Industrial Productivity, "The Decline of U.S.
Consumer Electronics Manufacturing: History, Hypotheses, Remedies," December, 1988.
20For an extended discussion of the supply base and architecture of supply concepts, see Michael Bonus,
"The Regional Architecture of Global Electronics," supra.
14
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technologies (and associated manufacturing skills) that went into electronic systems.2
The only alternative to increasing dependence on a closed oligopoly of rivals was to make
the supply architecture more open and competitive: In conjunction with government
policies and local private investors in Asia, US firms gradually turned their Asian
production networks into a flexible supply base alternative to Japanese firms.
The transformation from cheap labor affiliates to alternative supply base occurred
in three stages -- an initial stage from the late 1960s to late 1970s during which US firms
established their presence through foreign direct investments, a second stage in which
their Asian affiliates developed extensive local relationships in the shadow of the dollar
appreciation from 1980-1985, and a third stage from the late 1980s-early 1990s, when the
technical capabilities in their regional production networks were significantly upgraded
and local affiliates were assigned global product responsibilities. The US progression
from simple assembly affiliate to technologically able Asian production network contrasts
sharply with the development pattern of Japanese investments in the region over the
same time period. A brief review of key developments in each of the three stages will
highlight the differences.2 2
From the late 1960s, after an earlier round of market access investments by a few
large US MNCs, (notably IBM, GE and RCA), most US firms sought not market access
but cheap production locations in Asia. US investment was led by US chip-makers, then
consumer electronics and calculator producers, and finally, toward the end of the 1970s,
producers of industrial electronic systems like computers and peripherals. Most of the
U.S. investments in this first stage established local assembly affiliates. Cheap but
disciplined Asian labor permitted US firms to compete on price back home and in Europe.
21For the broad range of major component technologies involved, see the discussion in Borrus, Ibid.
22The characterization of US fdi is based on the BRIE US Electronics FDI database, compiled from public
sources and maintained by Greg Linden., and supplemented by industry conversations. The characterization
of Japanese electronics fdi in Asia which follows is consistent with, and in part draws on data and detail in
the chapters by Dennis Encarnation, Satashi Ohoka, Yasunori Baba, and Dieter Ernst, in Doherty, ed.,
Japanese Production Networks, supra. See especially also, Ken-ichi Takayasu and Yukiko Ishizaki, The
Changing International Division of Labor of Japanese Electronics Industry in Asia and Its Impact on the
Japanese Economy," RIM, Pacific Business and Industries, Vol. 1, #27, 1995, p.2-21.
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Right from the start, then, the Asian affiliates of US electronics firms were established as
part of a multinational production network to serve advanced country markets. By
contrast, most Japanese investment into Asia in this period, led by consumer electronics
and appliance makers, is aimed at serving nascent local markets behind tariff walls.
Japanese investment is often turnkey, with knock-down kits exported from Japan for
local final assembly and sale in the local affiliate's domestic market. While the Japanese
and US investments in this first stage are both oriented to simple assembly and
superficially appear similar, the vastly different markets being served pulled their
respective investments in divergent directions.
Consider the resulting logic of sunk investment for the two sets of firms. Because
their Asian affiliates were integrated into a production operation serving advanced
country markets, US firms upgraded their Asian investments in line with the pace of
development of the lead market being served, the US market. In essence, they upgraded
in line with US rather than local product cycles. By contrast, Japanese firms were led to
upgrade the technological capacities of their Asian investments only at the slower pace
necessary to serve lagging local markets. As local US affiliates became more sophisticated
through several rounds of reinvestment, a division of labor premised on increasing local
technical specialization developed throughout the US firms' global production operations.
Local needs began to diverge from those elsewhere in the US firm's overall operations and
affiliates sought out, and where necessary, trained local partners to meet them.
To be sure, the growth of local autonomy and relationships was constrained by
overall corporate strategies (e.g. where economies of scale dictated a global rather than
local sourcing arrangement), but over time US investments still led to greater technology
transfer and increasing technological capabilities for locals. By contrast, stuck in
developing market product cycles, off-shore Japanese affiliates benefited from no such
incentives to upgrade and no need to develop local supply relationships. Japanese firms
served the domestic and US markets wholly from home. Whatever their lagging Asian
affiliates needed could be easily supplied from Japan. As local Asian markets demanded
16
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the marginally more sophisticated goods whose product cycles had already peaked in the
advanced countries, the entire production capability for those could also be transferred
from Japan. Overall, less technology was transferred, and even that remained locked up
within the Japanese firm' s more limited circle of relations.
Thus, during the second stage (1980-1985) US-owned assembly platforms were
upgraded and enhanced technically to include more value-added, e.g., from assembly to
test in chips, from hand to automation assembly techniques, from simple assembly of
printed circuit boards to more complex subsystems and final assembly in industrial
electronics. As they gained more autonomy, US affiliates began to source more parts and
components locally (e.g., a range of mechanical parts, monitors, discrete chips and even
power supplies). As US affiliates developed and as the US industry exited the consumer
segment, local electronics producers in places like Taiwan shifted to concentrate more and
more of their own investment (and their government's attentions) on industrial
electronics.23 As these developments occurred, the contour began to appear of an ever
more elaborate and deepening technical division of labor between U.S. and Asian-based
operations, bound together in production networks serving US firms' advanced country
markets. In essence, a new supply base was being created in Asia under the control of US
and local, but not Japanese capital.
By contrast, the pattern of Japanese investment led to a dual production structure
under the control of Japanese firms and premised on traditional product cycles --
sophisticated products were produced at home with sophisticated processes to serve
advanced country markets, while lower-end products were produced with simple
processes in regional affiliates to serve local Asian markets. Both sets of operations
23On the progression from consumer to industrial electronics in Taiwan, see Chung Chin, "The Changing
Pattern of Division of Labor Across the Straits: Macro Overview and Sectoral Analysis on the Electronics
Industry," Chung Hua Institution of Economic Research, Taipei, September, and Scott Callon, "Different
Paths: The Rise of Taiwan and Singapore in the Global Personal Computer Industry, " Japan
Development Bank Discussion Paper Series, #9494, August, 1994. More generally, on the development of
Taiwan's information technology industry, see Kenneth L. Kraemer and Jason Dedrick,
"Entrepreneurship, Flexibility and Policy Coordination: Taiwan's Information Technology Industry,"
(Irvine: Center for Research on Information Technology and Organizations, 1995).
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sourced from a common supply base, located largely in Japan and controlled, directly or
indirectly, by Japan's major electronics companies. Where Japanese companies
responded to government or commercial pressures to localize, they did so from within
their established supply base -- that is, by transplanting the operation of an affiliated
domestic Japanese supplier - not by sourcing locally from the emerging Asian supply
base. In short, the Japanese production networks boasted redundant investment and
remained relatively closed, even as the US networks became more open and specialized.
These trends were fully elaborated during the third stage, from 1985-early 1990s
At home, US firms focused scarce corporate resources more intensely on new product
definition and the associated skills (e.g., design, architectures, software) necessary to
create, maintain and evolve de-facto market standards. In turn, they upgraded their Asian
affiliates, giving them greater responsibility for hardware value-added and manufacturing,
and significantly increased local sourcing of components, parts, and subassemblies. They
even contracted-out design and manufacture of some boards and components. Thus,
during this period, the Asian affiliates of US firms continued to migrate from PCB to final
assembly with increased automation; to increase both component production and final
system value-added; and to assume global responsibility for higher value-added systems
(e.g., from monochrome desktops to color notebook PCs). Their production networks
extended to more and more capable local Asian producers who became increasingly skilled
suppliers of components, subassemblies and, in some cases, entire systems. Even in
areas like memory chips and displays where Japanese firms remained important suppliers
to US firms, there was sufficient competition from other Asian sources (e.g., Korea in
memory chips) or sufficient political pressure to keep the supply architecture open.
Leading US producers of PCs like Apple illustrate well these developments. 24
Apple Computer Singapore (ACS) opened a PCB assembly plant for the Apple II PC in
24Based on press accounts, company annual reports and SEC 10K filings as compiled by Greg Linden in
the BRIE Asia FDI Database. See Linden, "Apple Computer East Asian Manufacturing Affiliates,"
November 7, 1994, unpublished summary.
18
_____lllll__lLl___
©Michael Borrus, Left for Dead, May 1996
1981. By 1983 nine local companies were contract manufacturing PCBs for the Apple Ie
and Lisa PCs. By 1985 ACS was upgraded to include final assembly of Apple Iles for
the world market. From 1986-89, ACS was expanded and upgraded to begin some
component design work. In 1990 ACS assumed final assembly responsibility for two of
three new Macintosh PCs (and PCBs for the third) and designed (locally) and
manufactured associated monitors. By then, essentially all components were sourced in
Asia (except the US-fabbed microprocessor) -- ACS's 130 major suppliers included local
firms like Gul Technologies and Tri-M (PCBs). ACS had also demonstrated that its
growing technical prowess could pay competitive dividends in speeding time to market: It
was able to move from designs to production roll-out in up to half the time of Apple's
other facilities. By 1992, ACS assumed responsibility for final assembly for all Asia-
Pacific markets, including Japan, was designing and supplying boards globally,
manufacturing monitors and some peripherals, and designing chips. Over $1 Billion was
being procured annually through ACS. In 1993, ACS set up a design center for Macs for
high-volume desk-top products -- Apple's only hardware design center outside the US.
By 1994, ACS had become the center for distribution, logistics, sales and marketing for
the Asia-Pacific region, and was assembling the MacClassic II, LC III and IV, mid-range
Centris, and Quadra 800 for global distribution. Regional sourcing reached $2 billion, half
from Japan (LCD displays, peripherals, memory, hard disk drives), another quarter from
Singapore, $250-500 million in Taiwan for OEM desktops, monitors, PCBs, Powerbooks
Digital Assistants, and chips. Korea's Goldstar also supplied monitors. By late 1994,
ACS had begun to design the motherboard and tooling for, and assemble the multimedia
system Mac LC 630 PC for worldwide export. Two new Mac products completely
designed and manufactured at ACS were launched in 1995.
The value-added/local sourcing progression of other major US electronics players
in Asia is broadly similar.25 For example, Compaq Asia (hereafter: CAS for Compaq
25For Compaq, see Linden, "Compaq East Asian Manufacturing Affiliates," November 7, 1994,
unpublished summary; for Hewlett-Packard, see Linden, "Hewlett-Packard East Asian Manufacturing
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Asia-Singapore) established its Singapore factory in 1986 for PCB assembly of
components sourced from Asia (including Japan), for desktop PCs to be final assembled
in the US. By 1994, after terminating an OEM relationship with Japan's Citizen Watch,
CAS was designing and manufacturing all notebook and portable PCs for worldwide
consumption, and all desktop PCs for the Asia-Pacific. Similarly, Hewlett-Packard's
Singapore operations evolved from assembly of calculators in 1977 to global
responsibility for portable printers and Pentium desk-top PCs and servers, with local
manufacturing, process design, tooling development, and chip design. Motorola's
Singapore operations evolved from simple PCB assembly of pagers and private radio
systems destined for the US in 1983, to world-wide mandates for design, development
and automated manufacture of double-sided six-layer PCBs, for design and development
of integrated circuits for disk drives and other peripherals, for some R&D, and for
sourcing of at least $500 million of parts and components within the region. Similar kinds
of stories could be told for ATT in telecommunications products, IBM and DEC in PCs
and peripherals, Maxtor, Connor, Seagate, and Western Digital in hard disk drives, and for
TI, Intel and National Semiconductor.
In sum, by the early 1990s, the division of labor between the US and Asia, and
within Asia between affiliates and local producers, deepened significantly, and US firms
effectively exploited increased technical specialization in Asia. In stark contrast, up
through the end of 1993, Japanese firms still controlled their Asian affiliates' major
decision-making and sourcing activities from Japan. More low-end process/product
technology had been off-shored, including production of audio systems (cassette
recorders, headphones, low-end tuners, etc.), under-20-inch televisions and some VCR
models, cameras, calculators and appliances like microwave ovens. Local Asian content
had risen toward 60%, but core technological inputs like magnetrons, chips and recording
heads were exclusively sourced from Japan, and the 60/6 'local' content was mostly
20
Affiliates," ovember 9, 1994, unpublished summary; for Motorola, see Linden. "Motorola East Asian
Manufacturing Affiliates," November 7, 1994, unpublished summary.
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supplied by the off-shore branch plants of traditional domestic Japanese suppliers. Local
design activities were invariably to tailor Japanese product concepts for local Asian
markets, and global mandates for advanced products, let alone their design, development,
and manufacture, were nowhere to be found outside of Japan. In contrast to US
producers, for example, Japanese PC producers sourced displays, memory, some
microprocessors, drives, power and mechanical components, plastics, and PCBs from
Japan (or in the case of some low-end components, from off-shore affiliates), and did
PCB and final assembly, and essentially all advanced design and development in Japan.
In short, Japanese firms intensified rather than rationalized their dual production
structure, and, by exclusion from their production networks, failed to benefit from
increasing, cheaper, and faster technical capabilities in the rest of Asia.
III: Indigenous Networks - From Supply Base to Competitor?
While Asia's indigenous electronics capabilities (excluding Japan) developed in
close symbiosis with the strategies and activities of American MNC firms, they were
driven by local private investment and supported by government policies. Outside of
Korea (where the chaebol dominated domestic electronics development), resident ethnic
Chinese investors played the principal, private entrepreneurial role in Taiwan and Hong
Kong, Singapore and later in Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand and along the Coastal
provinces of the Mainland of China. First in the NICs and then in Southeast Asia,
governments provided a panoply of fiscal and tax incentives, invested heavily in modern
infrastructure, generic technology development, and the technical up-skilling of the work
force, engaged in selective strategic trade interventions, and in some cases, even provided
market intelligence and product development roadmaps.26 The aims were both to plug
26 There were, of course, tremendous variations in the role played by state policy, and in the policies
themselves, in the different countries of the region. In highlighting a few commonalties, I do not mean to
slight those differences. The active role played in general by governments in the region has been explored
in detail in a variety of scholarly works. See, e.g., Robert Wade, Governing the Market: Economic
Theory and the Role of Government in East Asian Industrialization, (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1990); Stephan Haggard, Pathwaysfrom the Periphery. The Politics of Growth in the Newly
Industrializing Countries, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988). More recently, see the excellent
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into the developing multinational proltion networks in the region, and to use them as a
lever toward autonomous capabilities, the result, by the early 1990s, was burgeoning
indigenous electronics production throughout the region, mainly under the control of
indigenous capital.2
Outside of Korea's consumer electronics industry, advanced indigenous
electronics activity is concentrated in the personal computer (PC) and PC-related
product-markets. In turn, the nerve-centers of that activity in PC electronics are Taiwan
and Singapore, the home bases for emerging Asia-Pacific MNCs like the former's ACER
and the latter's Creative Technologies. As Table 1 shows, in 1994, Taiwanese firms held
from significant to dominant world market shares in 14 PC-related product categories.
Singapore, by contrast, a market about one-seventh Taiwan's size, produced about half of
the world's hard disk drives, most of its multimedia sound cards, and growing percentages
of computer printers, PC subassemblies and even finished PCs (about 5% world market
share) 28
contributions in Andrew MacIntyre, ed., Business and Government in Industrializing Asia, (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1994).
27 In focusing on Taiwanese and Singapore electronics capabilities, I am slighting the significant regional
investment by the Korean Chaebol who emerged during this period as major, region-wide producers of
consumer electronics and components. See, e.g., Martin D. Bloom, "Globalization and the Korean
Electronics Industry," Pacific Review, v.6 #2, 1993.
Callon, ibid.
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Table 1: Taiwan Firms' 1994 World
Market Share (%) in PC-Related
Products29
Motherboard 80%
Mouse 80%.
Scanner 61 %
Monitor i 56%.
Keyboard 52%
.Network Interface Card 34%-
!Graphics Card 32%
'Switching Power Supply 31%
Notebook PC 28%.
Video Card 24%.
Terminal 22%'
.-.Network Hub 1........ 8%
Audio Card 11 %
.Desktop PC '' 8%
!Source:Market Intelligence Center/Ill
.,;" ,"· ;>"*"~'"' ,,' 6,""'~'·"~""" '"' "'~'"~"""~"'i'';' , , ,..,.. ; w 5.
Of course, as argued earlier, the position of indigenous producers remains tied to the
production networks of foreign multinationals. Table 2 gives some indication of this by
examining the OEM relationships of major Taiwanese producers. In turn, however,
29 The Table is drawn from a presentation prepared by Tze-Chen (T.C.) Tu, Director of Taiwan's Market
Intelligence Center (of the Institute for Information Industries), "Upgrading Taiwan's IT Industry -- New
Challenges and the Role of International Cooperation," at the BRIE-Asia Foundation Conference,
Competing Production Networks in Asia: Host-Country Perspectives, San Francisco, April 27-28, 1995.
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Table 2: Taiwan Firms' 1994 OEM Relations in PC-
Related Products (representative sample) 30
OEMM Producer Buvers :Products
Apple, Fujitsu,
NEC, NCR, Notebooks
uata General,ian/or monitors
A -r iSiemenns i I
Apple,lta mApple, B Power Supplies
.Delta :Compaq, IBM-
DEcBMm Motherboards
Elite iNEC, Siemen
IATT, Dell, MotherboardsFIC Unisys 
Apple, 'PDA,
Inventa Compaq, Dell. Notebooks
'Compaq, Power Supplies
SLite-on DEC, Dell and/or Monitors
,Apple, -PCs and/or
'Packard Bell, Motherboards,
,' Tatung . NEC, Monitors
Sotrce: MIC/Ill and press accounts
by leveraging their OEM relationships and overall world market shares, several indigenous
Asian producers have emerged as increasingly autonomous forces in the electronics
industry. Indeed, in the early 1990s, intense competition and growing needs for scale-
intensive investment to stay in the game, forced a shake-out and consolidation among
Taiwanese and Hong Kong-based electronics firms. In particular, several major
Taiwanese MNCs have claimed growing shares of key product-markets and formed their
own regional production networks. The resulting industry concentration is most visible
in Taiwan's largest domestic product sectors, notably monitors, PCs and PCBs, where
the top ten indigenous producers now account for over 70% of the market.31 Leading
producers include firms like ACER, the Formosa Plastics Group, and Tatung. ACER, for
example, is Taiwan's largest PC firm, doing about $2.3 Billion in 1994 and being the
leading PC supplier outside of Japan in Asia, #2 in Latin America, and a rapidly growing
30 Ibid., supplemented by press reports.
31Chung Chin, "Changing Pattern," ibid., at p.18,
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#10 in the US. 32 ACER is the only Taiwanese firm with substantial backend distribution
and marketing under its own brand in the US. It fully designs and develops its own
systems, boards and many components including logic chips, and is moving into higher-
end systems like servers. Similarly, Formosa Plastics Group, the principal holding arm
of Taiwan's Wang family holdings and Taiwan's largest private enterprise, controls First
International Computer (FIC), Everex Systems, and Nan Ya Plastics.3 3 FIC (and its
subsidiary Formosa Industrial Computer) is the world's largest contract PCB
motherboard producer and, through Nan Ya Plastics the Group has expanded into
production (not assembly) of PCBs, chips and even monochrome LCDs.
Taiwan-based MNCs like those ride herd on an extensive indigenous supply base
of thousands of small and medium-sized design, component, parts, subassembly and
assembly houses throughout the China Circle and extending into Southeast Asia.. Thus,
for example, by the late 1980s, small firms (under 50 employees) accounted for about
two-thirds of the electronics enterprises on Taiwan, roughly double their share a decade
before when MNC consumer electronics firms dominated production.34 These firms form
an intricate sub-contracting structure of affiliated and family enterprises which comprise
the local production network and supply base. The numerous small firms are aligned
vertically with the few large scale enterprises and many trading companies that act as
intermediaries for foreign MNC customers.3 5 Designs and key components flow down
from the large-scale enterprises; more labor-intensive production activities flow up along
32Ibid., see Linden, supra. See also, Pete Engardio, "For ACER, Breaking up is Smart to do," Business
Week, July 4, 1994, p.82ff; and Louis Kraar, "Your next PC could be made in Taiwan," Fortune, August
8, 1994, p.90ff.
33Ibid., see Linden, supra. See also, Pete Engardio, "A New High-Tech Dynasty?" Business Week,
August 5, 1994, p.90ff.
34See the data in C.K. Paul Liu, Ying-Chuan Liu, and Hui-Lin Wu, "New Technologies, Industry and
Trade - the Taiwan Experience," Industry of Free China, January/February, 1990, p.7ff.
35For elaboration on the following, see, e.g., G.S.Shieh, "Network Labor Process: The Subcontracting
Networks in Manufacturing Industries of Taiwan," Academia Sinica, Bulletin of the Institute of Ethnology,
#71, Spring, 1991; Brian Levy and Wen-Jeng Kuo, "The Strategic Orientation of Firms and the
Performance of Korea and Taiwan in Frontier Industries: Lessons from Comparative Case Studies of
Keyboard and Personal Computer Assembly," World Development, v. 19,#4, 1990. I have also drawn on
an excellent paper by one of my graduate students, Fu-mei Chen, "From Comparative Advantage to
Competitive Advantage: A Case Study of Taiwan's Electronics Industry," unpublished manuscript, May
21, 1994.
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the subcontract network leading to final assembly. Divisible production tasks (e.g.,
components and subassembly steps) can be farmed-out all the way down to family job
shops and home-workers. Individual units within the network operate at small scale with
minimal capital investment requirements, and link on the informal bases of guanxi, that is,
kinship or friendship ties. The flexibility that results, mirroring the industrial district
capabilities in Italy and parts of Germany, makes it possible to increase or decrease
production scale on short notice, or to enter and exit niche product-market segments, all at
minimal cost and with minimal fixed investments.36
Another significant competitive advantage of the indigenous network structure is
what might be termed business 'speed', the ability to minimize the time it takes to move
from design specification to production and then to market with a quality product.
Industry estimates of Taiwanese network business speed peg the time from conception to
execution at a fraction of that of larger MNCs burdened with formal organization and
layered decision-making.37 In some cases, indigenous networks can design and execute in
less time than it takes the Japanese giants just to make a go-ahead decision.38 For the
Taiwanese design houses in particular, this capability is apparently built on a high-value-
added foundation, macro-cell based design methodologies and libraries of already-
characterized component functions that can be combined and altered to implement new
concepts.39 The rapid design capability then joins with the hyper-competition among
subcontractors in the network to implement the -new designs as fast as possible. Such
speed advantages pack an enormous competitive punch in electronics markets where
average product life cycles have roughly halved in the past five years - one of the reasons
36On European industrial districts, see the work on flexible specialization, notably, Michael Piore and
Charles Sable, The Second Industrial Divide: Possibilities for Prosperity, (NY: Basic Books, 1984).
37Representative estimates range from Apple's judgment that its Singapore operation can move a new
product into production in half the time of its other operations, to Ming Chien, Chairman of FC, whio
estimates that motherboards can be completely changed out (with all attendant alterations to the rest of the
system) in Taiwan in 2-3 weeks vs. up to a year in the US. On the former, see Singare ~Business Times,
11/27/90 p. 14; on the latter, see Callon, "Different Paths," supra.
38Kraar, "Your Next PC," supra, inferring from Dataquest estimates.
39See Callon, "Different Paths," supra, citing interviews in Singapore. Structured IC design approaches
were pioneered in the US at Universities like Berkeley and CalTech, where many Asian engineers were
formally trained.
26
-~~~~~~~~--- -. ~~~~~~~~~~~~-------~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~--~~~~~~~-- ·-- ^·-· ~~~ ~~~ ~~~ ~~~~ ~~~~l~~~~---s~~~~~~~~~~~-~~~~---- - - - ~ ~~~~~~ --s     ~   ~   I--- ~~~~~~~~-
OMichael Borrus, Left for Dead, May 1996
Taiwanese suppliers in particular have a thriving ODM business as subcontract design
houses for US and European MNCs.
Network speed is complemented by more traditional factor input advantages,
notably the relative cost of skilled engineering and technical labor (especially designers),
which, even in the maturing economies of Taiwan and Singapore, still costs less than a
third of comparable US or Japanese labor. The best indigenous networks also run
extremely lean in general, sales and administrative overheads where they match the best
practices of MNC leaders like Hewlett-Packard (at about 10% of sales for
microcomputers and printers), and are far superior to most advanced MNC performers
(15%-upwards of 20% of sales). 40 Of course, such cost-minimization is inherent in the
sub-contract structure of the especially the Taiwanese production networks where
affiliates and family enterprises can be squeezed (if necessary, in time-honored sweat-
shop manner).
Over the last half-decade, in response to steep rises in factor input costs in the
NICs, and exacerbated by currency appreciation, the indigenous Asian production
networks have become more and more regionalized. For example, Table 3 suggests the
extent to which considerable PC-related production is now being carried on by Taiwanese
MNCs within the region but outside of Taiwan. As the table suggests, production
outside of Taiwan accounts for a growing share of total production under Taiwanese
control, approaching one-quarter of the total in 1995.
Table 3: Domestic vs. Off-shore Production Value of Taiwan's
Electronics Industry, 1992-1995 ($-Millions) 41
1992 1993 1994 i1995(est.J
Domestic Productio 8391 9693 11579 13135
"Offshore Production" 973 1691 3003 4279
:.:." .- ^ . ........ 1  oa.. 2 H... ..,,,,.. ... .._zD: : ^4_¢ S>.,. ,,,, , _,, ..,,,,. ..... ..Offshore/Domestic(%) 11.60% 1 7.45% 25.93% 32.57%
source: MIcIII
4Based on industry discussions.
41Presentation by T.C. Tu, supra, n.30.
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Off-shore activity is concentrated in certain product segments, with about two-thirds of
'Taiwanese' production of keyboards, half of power supplies, and about a quarter of
monitors and motherboards now taking place outside of Taiwan. 42 Before the Mainland
became formally available, labor-intensive assembly of products like keyboards, low-end
monitors and power supplies shifted off-shore to Malaysia and Thailand. Since the late
1980s, however, and given the cultural affinity, mainland China has been the preferred
new investment site.
At least in the first instance, similar to the original motivation of many US MNCs,
cheap labor for high-volumes seems to be a prime motivation. In labor-intensive assembly
processes, official Taiwanese figures suggest cost savings of from 8% in monitor
assembly to greater than 20% with keyboards and the mouse. Critically, most of these
China investments are cooperative ventures, not wholly-owned subsidiaries, and they are
not only being carried out by the largest producers. Chung Chin cites a 1994 study by
Shu showing that of 38 Taiwanese monitor producers, 19 have established production
relationships on the Mainland since the early 1990s, and 6 others were planning to do
so.4 3 In the resulting division of labor, 14" monochrome and color monitors are assembled
on the Mainland or in other Asian locations, while Taiwanese production is upgraded to
larger display sizes. Of the 4 million monitors produced off-shore in Taiwanese networks
in 1993, half were assembled in China. The Mainland is increasingly also the site of other
production activities. For example, in addition to color monitors, FIC's two Guangdong
Province subsidiaries assemble PCBs and other components, and Mitac similarly does all
of its semi-finished assembly (frames and PCBs) on the Mainland.44 In all of these
products, the combination of Taiwanese capital, production know-how, and OEM
reputation with cheap Mainland labor and land, is making for an irresistible regional
42For this and the following official figures, see Chung Chin, "Changing Patterns," supra, p. 19-20, citing
MICIII data
43This and the following, see Chung Chin, "Changing Patterns," Ibid., at p.21-23.
44Engardio, supra n. 34, and Kraar, supra n.33.
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extension of Taiwanese networks. And the lure of the Mainland's market provides the
longer-term temptation.
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IV: From Ownership to Control: The Future of Competition and the Prospects for
Regional Identity
The emergence of competitive strategies in electronics premised on highly
articulated inter-firm, cross-border production networks has not eviscerated the analytic
significance of national distinctions based on ownership and origin. The evidence
presented above suggests rather, and perhaps paradoxically, that those distinctions still
have explanatory power: In Asia today, beneath the superficial similarity engendered by
aggregate trade and investment data and macro-analyses, lie distinctly different electronics
production networks under the control of US, Japanese and indigenous Asian
multinationals. The differences have had competitive consequences; they help to explain
why US firms prospered, indigenous Asian firms became significant players, and
Japanese firms suffered in the last round of competition. Table 4 provides a comparative,
albeit highly stylized typology of the different networks which is elaborated below.
Table 4: Typology of Electronics Production Networks in Asia
Characteristic US-Owned Japanese-Owned Taiwanese-Owned
Accessibility Oen Closed Insular
Responsiveness Fast/Opportunistic Cautious Fast/Flexible
Governance Decentralized Centralized Hierarchical
Permanence Disposable Long-term/stable Fluid
Supply Base Anyone meeting Domestic and Guanxi-
price, quality, Affiliated preferenced
delivery
constraints
Product Mix Sophisticated Low-end, esp. PC electronics
industrial consumer audio-
electronics visual
Division of Labor Off-shores high High value-added Off-shores low-end
value-added esp. in product/processes products/processes
components, at home, low off- and exploits non-
processes and shore, but Taiwanese value-
manufacturing, minimizes Asian added there and
and maximizes (i.e., non- . 1where otherwise
Asian value-added Japanese) value- N:cessary
added
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The US networks tend to be open to outsiders, fast and opportunistic in
implementation with significant decisions decentralized to affiliates or partners, and
capable of changing contour (and partners) as needs change -- in an image: open, fast,
opportunistic, decentralized and disposable. Their activities are centered in the NICs,
especially Singapore, but increasingly reach into the rest of Asia and China. By contrast,
the Japanese networks tend to be relatively closed to outsiders, more cautious to make
and implement significant decisions which are almost always generated from Japan, and
structured on stable, long-term business and keiretsu relationships -- that is, closed,
cautious, centralized, long-term and stable. Despite the recent surge of Japanese
investment into Asia, their networks are still most definitely centered in Japan.
The respective networks also rely on distinctively different supply bases, boast
different product mixes, and, most significantly, constitute very different divisions of
labor. The US networks rely on an open, competitive supply architecture in which
Japanese, US, Taiwanese, Singapore, Korean and other Asian firms compete on cost,
quality and time-to-market and, in some cases, provide significant value-added. By
contrast, the Japanese networks rely on a largely domestic and affiliated supply base with
little value-added by other Asian producers. The US networks produce (and in some
cases design and develop) increasingly sophisticated industrial electronics like hard disk
drives, PCs, InkJet Printers, and telecommunications products. The Japanese networks
still mostly produce consumer audio-visual electronics and appliances. The US networks
exploit a complementary division of labor in which US firms specialize in especially
'soft' competencies (definition, architecture, design - standards areas) and Asian firms
specialize in hard competencies (components, manufacturing stages and
design/development thereof). By contrast, the Japanese networks exploit a division of
labor with significant redundancies in which domestic Japanese operations produce high-
value, high end products using sophisticated processes, and off-shore affiliations produce
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low-value, low-end prodlucts. 4 5 The US networks exploit increasing technical
specialization throughout the production process in which the Asian contribution is
maximized; the Japanese networks exploit a value-added specialization between products
in which the Asian (i.e., not Japanese) contribution is minimized.
By comparison, the emerging indigenous Asian networks like those of Taiwanese
MNCs Acer, Mitac or the Formosa Plastics group, take still a different form. It is hardly
surprising that on some dimensions they appear to emulate features of both the Japanese
and US MNC approaches. However, the prevalence of distinctive characteristics of their
own suggests that the indigenous Asian networks are a sui generis form of network
organization, not a mere hybrid of US and Japanese ideal types.46 Much like the
Japanese, Taiwanese networks are difficult for outsiders to penetrate. They tend to be
very hierarchically organized, though less reliant for decision-making on their point of
origin than the Japanese. Much like the US, Taiwanese networks can move very fast in
implementing decisions. Because they are much less constrained than the Americans by
the need for legally-enforceable relations, they tend to be even more flexible in the kinds
of relationships embodied and in the ability to shift contours as markets shift. Unlike
either, Taiwanese networks are based on guanxi (rather than legal or keiretsu) ties which
change fluidly as needs change but apparently without abandoning reciprocal obligations
over the long-term. In short, the Taiwanese networks appear to be insular, fast,
hierarchical, flexible and fluid. They tend to be centered in the China Circle with
significant Southeast Asian investment as a hedge. Like the Americans, the Taiwanese
networks seek to exploit a highly competitive supply base and concentrate on industrial
electronics, albeit mostly PC-related. Much like the Japanese, Taiwanese networks retain
in the home base high value-added products manufactured with more advanced processes,
and off-shore to cheaper production locations lower value-added products and simpler
45This is also a principal conclusion of Takayasu and Ishizaki, supra, who call this "intrafirm product-to-
product division of labor," at p. 1 lff.
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processes. Unlike the Japanese, however, the Taiwanese networks also self-consciously
leverage increasing technical specialization through local relationships for the off-shored
products and processes. And unlike both, the Taiwanese network relationships are
increasingly China-centered -- rather than using a NIC base as the regional center,
Taiwanese networks may end up with a China base as their global center, using demand
and technical know-how in the domestic China market to achieve world-class scale, costs
and innovation.
As argued at the outset, these differences between US, Japanese and indigenous
networks were competitively consequential in the last round of market battles in
electronics. The US networks relieved the constraining threat of competitive dependence
on Japanese rivals by re-constituting the architecture of supply in electronics.
Simultaneously, the turn to skilled but cheaper Asian suppliers helped to lower overall
production costs, fierce competition within the supply base helped to reduce turnaround
times, and specialization and diversity within the network permitted US producers to
keep better pace than Japanese rivals with rapid technological and market shifts.
Growing Asian technical capabilities freed US firms to focus their efforts (and scarce
resources) on new product definition, systems integration, software value-added and
distribution. In the bargain, the US networks helped to spawn and sustain direct Asian
competition to Japanese firms in several of their stronghold markets like memory chips,
consumer electronics and displays. And while indigenous Asian network capabilities
grew prodigiously, they did not directly challenge revived US leadership in the last round
of competition.
National distinctions between electronics firms are likely to continue to be
competitive differentiators for the foreseeable future. But the development of inter-firm,
cross-border relationships does appear to have changed the significance of ownership and
46Some commentators treat the Chinese capitalized networks as hybrid forms of organization. See, e.g..
Dieter Ernst, "Hybrid Forms of Organization - the International Production Networks of Taiwanese
Electronics Firms," (BRIE and IGCC, 1996, forthcoming).
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origin-- perhaps even in ways that will eventually undermine their explanatory capacity.
To see how requires detouring through the motives that lie behind the development of the
network relationships. The electronics case suggests that firms are motivated by four
principal goals in developing the new relational forms of competition.47 Production
networks are first an effort to develop forms of organization that provide greater
flexibility, responsiveness, risk-sharingand efficiency under conditions of high market and
technological uncertainty. Second, that uncertainty also provokes firms to develop
relationships to exploit complementary assets held by other firms - for example, to
develop something new that no partner could as effectively alone (within given
constraints of time and cost) or because rationalization around areas of core competence
requires contracting-out non-core functions. Production networks are also an effort to
achieve better access -- to foreign markets, technologies, investment opportunities and the
like - in 'global' markets that retain a panoply of formal and informal barriers to trade
and investment.
Finally, the new relational forms are also principally about creating or removing
market imperfections and raising or surmounting barriers to competitive entry. This is
clearest in the case of standards coalitions, where the alliance network is aimed at
generating (or challenging) a defacto market standard and customer lock-in. But
competition in electronics is increasingly about developing and sustaining monopoly
niches, whether through ownership and control of a de facto standard or by maintaining a
differentiated product through the ability to add performance, functionality, features or
improve costs faster than competitors. Indeed, profitability in electronics is almost
purely a function of the resulting market structure - high where quasi-monopoly position
can be maintained, essentially nonexistent everywhere else. That is why so-called value-
chain analysis can be so misleading in evaluating this industry to the extent that it implies
the need to find profits by moving up a hypothetical food chain that starts in components
471 derive these solely from the electronics case, but there is broad support in the literature on strategic
alliances which tends to emphasize the ifst three, where 'as the forth may be most significant at least in
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and assembly and ends with services and content. As Intel demonstrates in components
and Matsushita's recent desultory experience with MCA suggests in content-creation,
profits can be won or lost at any point in the value-chain if the market is structured
accordingly. While they may also fulfill the other motives suggested above, production
networks are self-conscious efforts to structure markets in ways that increase profits by
removing direct competitors, creating differentiability, erecting entry barriers and the like.
Whatever the precise mix of motives, in most cases what a firm needs -- and the
resulting division of labor within its production network that embodies those needs and
fulfills that mix -- derives in the first instance from what it lacks in its home environment.
Or to put it in slightly different terms, the hypothesis is that the shape of a firm's
international production network reflects its ability to exploit location-specific advantages
at its point of origin and to fill-in complementary elements as necessary with
relationships that exploit location-specific advantages elsewhere.4 8 In turn, the shape and
character of the resulting network reflect differences in the ability to control the
relationships comprised by the network - control that also derives initially from the
point of origin. Thus, the setting, maintenance and evolution of de facto standards set in
the domestic US launch market was the principle instrument used by U.S. firms to
preserve control over their inter-firm networks. So long as U.S. firms maintained that role
in the division of labor-by defining and executing an evolutionary path for improved
performance-functionality-cost that kept customers locked-in to their standards-it was
extremely difficult for other firms in the network to challenge for the lead. US networks
could be highly decentralized because control over standards enabled devolution of
responsibility for significant value-added to partners without fear of losing the ability to
orchestrate the network. By contrast, with control residing in their domestic-based
manufacturing and core-component technologies, any significant devolution of
information technology markets. See, e.g., Mytelka.
48 This is broadly consistent with work on the location decisions of multinationals. In addition to Porter
and Dunning, supra, see John Cantwell, "The globalization of technology: What remains of the product
cycle model?" Cambridge Journal of Economics, 1995, #19, p. 155-174.
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responsibility by Japanese firms over those competencies to outsider partners risked
creating a direct competitor. Japanese networks had to be centralized to avoid that
outcome.
The electronics case suggests that at the moment, for most firms, the point of
origin will remain the principle source of control over their production networks. For
most firms, control resides at home because that is where development of new product or
process concepts, standards-setting and associated launch market opportunities are most
developed, where local capacities and technical specialization are still exploited most
fully, where, as argued in the introduction, the initial patterns of constraint and
opportunity to which firms respond are first set. So long as the source of control over
the shape and character of a firm's production network stems from its point of origin in
the ways indicated, corporate nationality will continue to matter to market competition in
electronics.
But will those sources of control remain largely national? As production
networks become ever more articulated and cross more borders, it is easy to envision
circumstances under which each of those sources of control migrates out from the point of
origin to other places in the network. The ability of US firms to drive development of
some process and manufacturing competencies out of their Asian affiliates provides one
hint of what is possible. The competitive adjustment of Japanese firms provides still
more: As Japanese firms respond to the relative success of US and indigenous Asian
firms they are beginning to rationalize an Asia-regional network structure very different
from that of US or indigenous producers.49 That rationalization would turn the precise
characteristics of Japan's Asia-based networks that created vulnerability over the last
decade -- closed, cautious, centralized, long-term and stable - into competitive strengths.
Japanese firms could decide to accept slower domestic growth and the need to exploit
technical capabilities in the rest of Asia as givens. They could decide to selectively
49 See the chapter by Dennis Tachiki in this volume.
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incorporate indigenous Asian producers into the family and build stable, long-term,
mutually advantageous ties focused on exploiting specific technological capabilities in
other parts of Asia. They could decide to invest for the long-term. They could decide to
drive their growth from Asia's: If Asia becomes a launch market for new product
concepts -- and it's rapid growth and burgeoning wealth suggest that it must in some
market segments - Japanese firms might just then be better positioned to exploit the
development.50
Just as big a competitive wild card is the growing indigenous electronics capability
in the China Circle and Southeast Asia. A competitive indigenous producer scenario
premised on regional rather than national origin, is easy enough to describe: The
combination of Hong Kong-based financial and producer services, with Taiwan-based
digital product and process design, Southeast Asian component specialization, highly
skilled but cheap Mainland labor, and, of course, the Mainland market, provides a
tantalizing scenario for regional dominance. The network characteristics identified above -
- insulated from outside control, fast, hierarchical, flexible and fluid -- appear to be a
compelling mix for exploiting the region's possibilities. And the sheer scale of production
for the mainland and, from the mainland, for overseas markets would dwarf the leverage
provided by any other regional market base. To this potent brew should be added the
self-conscious developmental intent of local (not necessarily national) governments
throughout the region to nurture indigenous capabilities.
The quite significant constraints on the emergence of such a scenario should not be
underestimated, of course, for significant elements of control are likely to remain with US
or Japanese firms for some time. Unlike the Americans, who have retained capability in
most core component technologies and a significant though diminished position in capital
50In fact, the opportunity to drive development out of Asia is already appearing in a set of significant
potential product markets. These include broadcast media where firms like HongKong's TVB and
Murdoch's Star TV are pioneering direct broadcast TV transmission, software where indigenous concepts
could lead in new directions, and segments of the wireless communication markets where, for example,
Motorola projects that China will pass the US to become its largest market for pagers in the next few years.
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goods, the indigenous networks remain dependent on Japanese competitors for advanced
manufacturing equipment and high value-added core components (e.g., for Taiwanese
producers, $500 million of LCD displays and $3 Billion of memory chips in 1994). Even
more of a constraint, however, is continuing dependence on the American networks for
microprocessor architectures, advanced product concepts, and global distribution. It is
likely that the burgeoning regional market can eventually help to break those constraints --
by providing the returns to invest to relieve core component dependence, the new
product concepts that can become global standards, and leverage to develop indigenous
brands and global distribution channels. Only then, perhaps, could we convincingly begin
to talk about real regional, as distinct from national identity for firms operating in Asia.
But such developments are likely to take time, perhaps even several decades. Until then,
so long as a firm's point of origin remains the primary source of control over its network,
ownership will continue to matter to competition in electronics.51
51Even with the development of distinctive regional rather than national sources of control, I would not
expect the Japanese, US and indigenous Asian networks to converge much They will continue to be
differentiated by the balance of regional emphasis in their operations: So long as Japanese, US, and
indigenous firms continue to be driven by a very different balance among local linkages, strategies,
industrial structures, and policy, local capital market and labor market influences, their network differences
are likely to persist even if they converge in competitive purpose or in the geographic reach of operations.
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